We provide the first firm-level evidence of the impact of the trade in producer services ("offshoring") on the labour market. Using a new dataset which measures trade in services at the firm-level, we find no evidence that importing intermediate services is associated with job losses or greater worker turnover. Using regression and propensity score matching techniques, we show that firms which start importing intermediate services experience faster employment growth than equivalent firms which do not.
Introduction
In this paper we provide the first firm-level evidence of the impact of the trade in producer services ("offshoring") on the labour market. Specifically, we compare the employment growth of firms which import (and export) producer services with observably identical firms which do not.
The fear that offshoring may destroy large numbers of jobs in developed economies is widespread in the popular media.
1 Blinder (2006) and others have suggested that this fear arises because offshoring has the potential to impact workers who were previously insulated from international competition. This is essentially for two reasons. First, firms are now able to trade not just physical inputs, but also service inputs which were previously regarded as nontradeable. Second, some of these services, such as research and development, customer services or IT support are not typically thought of as being "low-skilled". Thus, offshoring may affect high-skilled workers in service occupations. However, there is a stark contrast between the popular perception of offshoring (see Smith (2006) for some examples) and the limited academic literature which examines the actual impact on firms and the labour market (e.g. Amiti and Wei (2005) ).
Despite the strong policy interest, our understanding of trade in services is very limited, especially compared to the theoretical and empirical advances which have been made in relation to the trade in goods. This is at least partly due to the paucity of detailed and high quality data on trade in services. 2 Wei (2005, 2006) provide the only previous studies to have explicitly looked at the role of service offshoring for employment, but they use industry-level measures of offshoring.
We examine whether there is evidence that offshoring actually costs jobs or affects job security in the UK. To do this we use a relatively new dataset for the United Kingdom, the Inquiry into International Trade in Services (ITIS). ITIS is the only UK dataset to systematically collect information on imports and exports of services at the firm-level. ITIS covers the import and export of intermediate services. Imports of services in the data therefore correspond closely to the concept of "offshoring".
1 A frequently cited example is Lou Dobbs: "The shipment of American jobs to cheap foreign labor markets threatens not only millions of workers and their families, but also the American way of life . . . for the first time in history, corporations are laying off Americans from well-paying jobs and replacing them with low-paid foreign workers. A recent study revealed that 14 million American jobs are now at risk of being outsourced overseas." (Dobbs 2004) 2 See the recent discussion in Sturgeon (2006) .
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We link ITIS to a comprehensive database of UK firms which allows us to measure each firm's employment, job creation and job destruction. Since the work of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) , it has been widely recognised that measuring net employment change is not sufficient to determine the impact of a shock (such as increased international trade) on the labour market. This is because such shocks might entail a massive reallocation of jobs within and across firms while leaving employment levels relatively unchanged.
This paper thus presents the first firm-level study of the impacts of trade in services on employment and job turnover. We begin in Section 2 by clarifying exactly what we mean by "offshoring" and considering what theory tells us about the possible effects of increased trade in services on labour markets. The data are described in Section 3 and some descriptive evidence is given in Section 4. Our main econometric evidence is presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
Background
The data we use reflects the international fragmentation of production activities into components that can be produced in different countries. Initially, this phenomenon was associated with manufacturing activities, but firms are increasingly able to fragment service activities as well. Indeed, popular concerns regarding outsourcing have tended to focus on these service activities.
In the present paper, following the typology of organization modes proposed by UNCTAD (2004), we use the term service offshoring to refer to the importing of producer services. The typology distinguishes four different organizational forms based on two dimensions: location and internalization (or ownership). A domestically integrated firm conducts all production activities in a single country and does not make use of any independent suppliers of producer services: all service activities are conducted in-house.
A firm is considered to engage in domestic outsourcing when all activities are performed in a single country, but some activities are purchased from an independent domestic supplier.
A firm that makes uses of activities that are produced in different countries is said to engage in offshoring. This will typically be associated with trade in intermediates (Feenstra and Hanson 1996) or in the terminology of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) "trade in tasks". Offshoring, moreover, can be organized at arm's length, in which case one may refer to this as international outsourcing or offshore outsourcing, or alternatively, it may be conducted 2 in-house, resulting in intra-firm trade associated with vertical FDI.
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Most theoretical contributions that have analyzed the labour market effects of offshoring have adopted a general equilibrium approach and have therefore tended to focus on wages. 4 In general, these studies conclude that almost anything can happen to wages depending on the configuration of sectoral factor-intensities, the relative factor-intensity of components relocated abroad and relative factor endowments.
In order to analyze the implications of offshoring for workers at the firm level, it may be more appropriate to focus on employment in partial equilibrium. Absent from scale effects, offshoring should lead to labour productivity gains and a reduction in employment in the offshoring firm, ceteris paribus. However, the cost-saving and productivity gains associated with offshoring may induce an expansion in the scale of production and therefore employment. The total effect of offshoring on employment is therefore an empirical matter.
There is very little evidence at present on the effects of service offshoring on labour market outcomes, and almost none which uses data at the firm level. 5 Wei (2005, 2006) provide the first studies to have explicitly looked at the role of service offshoring for employment. Using industry-level data for the US, they find a small negative effect of service offshoring on employment when using a very finely disaggregated industry classification, but that these effects disappear when using more aggregated data. Hijzen and Swaim (2007a) show, using industry-level data for the manufacturing sector in a range of OECD countries, that scale effects can be very large and may even offset the direct effect on employment due to the substitution of home value-added by foreign value-added.
An important caveat relates to whether firms are actually switching from integrated domestic production to international outsourcing. It is possible that many firms are actually switching from domestic outsourcing to international outsourcing. In this case we would not expect any direct employment displacement, but we would expect a positive output effect. This distinction is discussed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) , who argue that it is important to distinguish between imported inputs from the same industry that is purchasing the intermediate inputs,
and imported inputs from other industries. Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) and Hijzen and Swaim (2007a) show that the effect of offshoring on employment is positive when the components offshored are produced in industries other than that of the offshoring firm. This may be because firms are switching from domestic outsourcing to offshore outsourcing. Thus, tasks which are carried out within the firm are not themselves being outsourced.
In addition to affecting employment, offshoring may also impact job turnover. One reason for this might be firm heterogeneity. Offshoring is unlikely to have the same effect on all firms because the extent to which scale effects outweigh displacement effects will vary across firms. Consequently, the ITIS is consistent with the recommendations made in the IMF Balance of Payments Manual (BPM5 IMF 1993) which relate to, amongst other things, the definition, valuation and classification of trade in services.
In line with BPM5 recommendations, ITIS employs the residential definition to document trade in services. This implies that transactions are not included on the basis of nationality or legal criteria, but "on a transactor's centre of economic interest" (p.26 UN 2002) . This definition differs slightly from that employed within the framework of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The GATS considers four 'modes' through which services can be traded internationally, which are based on the respective location of the consumer and supplier during the transaction. Under the residential definition, trade in services will generally include: services that are being supplied across borders without either the consumer or the supplier having to move into the economic territory of the other (Mode 1); services that are being supplied by which a consumer resident in one country moves to the resident country of the supplier (Mode 2), and services that are being supplied by which a supplier resident in one country temporarily moves to the resident country of the consumer, either on his/her own behalf or of that of his/her employer (Mode 4). Trade in services to residents of a foreign 6 Turnover may also increase within firms as a result of offshoring. For example, firms may adjust their employment mix even if overall employment remains static. However, we cannot measure this compositional effect in our data. In the long-run, offshoring may affect job turnover because firms can more easily substitute domestic workers for their foreign counterparts in response to changes in relative wages across countries (Rodrik 1997 , OECD 2007 . Hijzen and Swaim (2007b) provide empirical evidence for a range of OECD countries that this may indeed be the case. country through commercial presence in that country is excluded (Mode 3) and is covered by a separate survey (Foreign Affiliates Trade in Services).
BPM5 further recommends that transactions are valued at market prices. It seems plausible, however, that in a great number of cases trade in services does not take the form of "arm's length" transactions at market prices, but instead reflects intra-firm transactions subject to transfer pricing. However, there is no information available in ITIS on whether trade takes the form of arm's length or intra-firm transactions.
A particularly interesting feature of ITIS is that transactions are not recorded on the basis of the industry of the importing or exporting firm but on the type of service transacted. This reflects the notion that traded services typically act as inputs to commercial activities rather than simply as consumables. Firm-level datasets that include information on trade in goods at the firm-level typically assume that products traded correspond to the main industry in which the trading firm is active. With the emergence of increasingly complex business structures and the rising importance of trade in intermediate inputs, this assumption becomes increasingly problematic.
The survey covers 39 different types of services. ITIS excludes: travel and transport (covered by the International Passenger Inquiry); some banking, financial and legal services; higher education (covered by Higher Education Statistics Agency); and film and television companies.
In addition to the type of service traded the data also provide information on the origin of imports and the destination of exports.
ITIS was first collected in 1996, and response to the survey by firms is statutory (ONS 2003) . 5 the sampling design was extended to 'mop up' industries on a rotational basis to improve the coverage of the economy.
As with other surveys conducted by the ONS, the survey is sent out to 'reporting units'. In the vast majority of cases a reporting unit is equivalent to a business or enterprise, but large enterprises may have several reporting units. ITIS does not include information on reporting units with less than 10 employees. In 2003 the response rate was 90% for QITIS and 85% for AITIS.
The Annual Business Inquiry
In order to analyse the impact of services trade on employment and job turnover we link the ITIS to the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). This is an annual survey of UK businesses which, since 1994, is also sampled from the IDBR. The 'selected sample' of the ABI is a census of all large businesses employing 250 or more, and a sample of smaller businesses. The 'nonselected sample' comprises those businesses in the sampling frame which were not selected for the survey. For firms in the selected sample the ABI provides a rich set of variables, while for non-selected firms the information available is limited to employment, industry and region (see Jones (2000) for a more detailed description). The linking process between the ABI and ITIS is relatively straightforward because both datasets include a unique identifying code that refers to the reporting unit and both sources are directly sampled from the IDBR. Table 1 lists the number of reporting units which underlie the analysis. The ITIS comprises about 10,000 reporting units (essentially firms) up to 2000, and was subsequently expanded to about 20,000 from 2001 onward. About one-third of all firms in the ITIS report that they either import or export services, while about 15% of firms import and export.
Some descriptive statistics

The sample
[ Table 1 here.]
Trade in services by UK firms
The ITIS survey measures the majority of trade in services by UK firms, excluding transportation and travel and financial services. In Figure 1 we plot total imports and exports as measured by ITIS against the equivalent entries from the UK balance of payments ONS (2006) . The unweighted ITIS estimates accounts for about 80% of official estimates. suggests that UK trade in services has grown tremendously since the early 1990s. As is well-known, the UK runs a substantial balance of payments surplus in services trade, which has also grown significantly and is currently worth over £20 billion annually. The increase in the sample in 2001 did not have a dramatic effect on the estimated value of services trade, suggesting that the majority of large trading firms were already in the sample before that point.
What services do UK firms trade? In Table 2 we list the value of imports and exports for each category of services trade in the ITIS, ordered by the total value of trade. The bottom panel groups these services into the more aggregate categories which we will use in our analysis.
The largest single item is 'payments or receipts for intangible assets', which are essentially royalties and licence fees. One might argue that trade such as this does not represent "offshoring" in the usual sense. Nevertheless, since a firm has the choice between developing a 8 Note that the Pink Book estimates reported in Figure 1 already exclude financial services.
7 production technology in-house or paying a licence fee for such a technology, such payments should be classified as offshoring.
UK firms have significant trade surpluses in the eight most important categories, including computer services, research and development and financial services. The most important service where the UK runs a deficit is in telephone services, which accords with the popular perception of call-centre offshoring.
[ Table 2 here.] Table 3 breaks down UK trade by region. Three quarters of all trade by value is with Western Europe and North America, of which 25% is with the US alone. Less than 4% is with countries whose per capita GDP is less than 10% of the UK's. Furthermore, the UK has a trade surplus with low-, middle-and high-income countries.
[ Table 3 here.]
To examine the regional aspect more closely, Table 4 breaks down the four main categories of trade (as defined in Table 2 ) against trading region by income. Interestingly, the only area in which the UK has a trade deficit is in Telecommunication Services (which includes call centres) with low-income countries. Nevertheless, this deficit is dwarfed by surpluses elsewhere.
[ Table 4 here.]
Finally, in Table 5 we use the linked ITIS-ABI data to look at the industry of firms which are importing and exporting services. The most striking feature is that firms in manufacturing industries are involved both in a large proportion of all imports and exports. Since these firms are, by definition, not producing services as a final output, manufacturing firms are exporting as well as importing intermediate inputs. For example, a manufacturing firm might export blueprints or research and development to other firms, possibly including firms which are within the same enterprise group. In contrast, exports by firms in Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities may include exports of the final output of the firm. The fact that firms may export intermediate inputs is not, we believe, widely recognised.
[ Table 5 here.]
Employment, employment growth and job turnover
We now examine the relationship between our firm-level measures of trade in services and employment growth/job turnover. We follow Biscourp and Kramarz's (2007) method for decomposing employment changes between different firm types categorised by their trading status. Each firm is observed over the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] , and for each we compute employment at the beginning and end of the sample period as
Firms which enter the sample after 1997 have L 
Employment growth over the sample period is then defined as
Defining employment growth in this way ensures that it lies in the range [−2, 2] in the presence of firms which enter and exit the sample (Davis and Haltiwanger 1999) . To aggregate employment growth across firms, ∆L i is weighted by each firm's share of total employment. Job creation rates are defined as the weighted sum of employment growth across all firms with ∆L i > 0, and job destruction is the weighted sum of employment growth across all firms with ∆L i < 0. Table 6 summarises employment, employment growth and job turnover. For comparison, the top panel reports these quantities for all firms in the ABI, which represent the vast majority of all UK firms. 9 The second panel shows the results for firms in the ABI which also appear in ITIS. Although only about 2% of firms in the ABI appear in ITIS, the sample accounts for over one-third of total employment because the sample is so heavily weighted toward large firms: firms which appear in ITIS are nearly twenty times larger, on average. Firms in ITIS which exist in 1997 and 2004 ("continuing firms") experience very strong employment growth (25% over the period) and account for 71% of total employment in the sample. These firms also experience higher rates of job creation and lower rates of job destruction than the population of continuing firms from which the ITIS sample is drawn.
[ Table 6 here.]
Each firm is then categorized according to its import and export behaviour over the sample period, so that each firm is in only one import or export category. 10 Amongst continuing firms, about three-quarters never import or export services. Firms which always import services are more than twice as large as those which never do so, while firms which always export services are about one-third larger than those that never do so. The largest firms of all are those which start importing during the sample period, or those which change their import status more often.
In line with the findings of Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) and Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2005) , who analyse the firm-level relationship between trade in goods and employment, we find that the lowest rate of employment growth is amongst firms which stop importing or stop exporting. However, we do not observe the enormous growth rates observed by Bernard et al. (2005) amongst firms which start trading. We do find that firms which start to trade in services have faster employment growth than firms which stop trading, but firms which never import also have faster rates of employment growth. There is also little evidence in Table 6 of a relationship between firm exit and trading status. Approximately the same proportion of exiting firms are importing and exporting services as amongst continuing firms.
Trading status may affect gross job turnover independent of any effect on net employment growth. This will occur if offshoring has different effects on employment growth in different firms: offshoring might cause some firms to shrink, and others to grow. However, the final two columns of Table 6 show that differences in job creation rates are broadly in line with differences in employment growth rates; for example, firms which stop importing or stop exporting have the lowest rates of job creation and employment growth. Interestingly, the lowest rates of job destruction are actually observed in those firms which start importing services.
The aggregate picture presented in Table 6 might mask important differences according to the nature of the service being traded, nature of trading partner or nature of trading firm. In Table 7 we separate the sample into manufacturing firms and firms in financial and business services. We might expect different responses to service imports and exports because for manufacturing firms services trade is undoubtedly the trade in intermediate inputs, whereas for services firms the trade is more similar to traditional trade in final goods. Table 7 shows that, as with the whole sample, firms which start to import services have much higher growth rates than firms which stop importing services. Interestingly, manufacturing firms which start to export services experience the largest employment falls and particularly large job destruction rates, whereas services firms which start exporting services have particularly high employment growth.
[ Table 7 here.]
In Table 8 we examine trade with high-and low-income countries separately. It is striking that firms which trade with low-income countries are very large, with an average firm size of over 1000 employees. However, the ranking of firm types in terms of employment growth is identical for trade with high-and low-income countries. Firms which never import actually have the highest growth rates, and firms which start importing do better than firms which stop. In terms of exports, firms which start exporting have the fastest employment growth and firms which stop the slowest employment growth.
[ Table 8 here.]
Finally, in Table 9 we examine trade split into business services, telecoms services and technical services. Firms which trade in telecoms are larger than those which trade in business or technical services, but the patterns of employment growth are once again very similar. Firms which never trade or which start trading tend to grow faster than firms which stop trading or which continue trading.
[ Table 9 here.]
To summarise, firms which import services (offshore) are larger than those which export services. Firms which offshore services to low-income countries, and those which offshore telecoms services are largest of all. These findings suggest that there exist substantial fixed costs to starting to import or export services. The fact that the fixed costs for importing may be as important, or even more important, than for exporting has so far received little attention in the literature. The fixed costs to importing may relate to the search costs of identifying intermediate suppliers located abroad.
There is no evidence in the raw data that firms which start to offshore experience employment falls or that they destroy jobs. In fact, firms which start to import services tend to have faster employment growth than firms which stop. However it is possible that we are not capturing a genuine switch from integrated domestic production to international outsourcing. Rather, these firms are simply replacing domestic outsourcing with international outsourcing.
It is also noticeable that firms which never offshore tend to have faster rates of employment growth.
Econometric estimates
The descriptive statistics reported in the previous section might be explained by the very different characteristics of firms which trade services and those which do not. Most obviously, firms which trade services are much larger than those which do not. In addition, ITIS is a sizeweighted sample. This implies that there will be a correlation between a firm's appearance pattern in the data and the trading categories we used in the previous section. For example, a firm which starts importing must be observed at least twice in the ITIS survey. This suggests that any comparison of firms should control both for their size and their appearance pattern in the ITIS survey.
In this section therefore we examine the impact of trade in services on employment growth controlling for these differences in characteristics. We use both regression and propensity score matching techniques to do this.
Continuing firms' employment growth
Our basic sample consists of firms observed in the ABI in 1997 and 2004 ("continuing firms") and which appear in ITIS at least twice during that period. For firms which appear in ITIS only once we cannot calculate changes in trading behaviour. This leaves a total sample of 19,114 continuing firms.
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Let M it be a dummy variable which equals 1 if firm i imports services at time t and zero otherwise. Let V M it be the total value of imports, which will be zero if M it = 0. X it and V X it are similarly a dummy for exporting and a measure of the value of exports. Our basic model is loosely based on that used by Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) and is specified as
We regress the proportionate change in employment as defined in (1) on measures of the change in import and export status and change in value of imports and exports over the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . The change in the value of imports and exports variables are defined in exactly the same way as employment growth:
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We also need to control for observable differences between trading and non-trading firms. The vector x i includes firms' initial sales in 1997, employment in 1997 (10 discrete categories), firms' initial import and export status, industry (33 categories), region (10 categories) and whether the firm is foreign-owned. Table 10 reports estimates of the effects of services trade on employment growth.
[ Table 10 here.]
Importing effects
The results in column (1) are consistent with the descriptive statistics presented earlier. Firms which start importing services over the sample period experience faster employment growth of about 8% per year. In addition, there is also a positive relationship with increases in the quantity of imports. Firms which were already importing at the beginning of the period also experience significantly faster employment growth.
It might be argued that firms which import intermediate services also typically export intermediate services, and that the positive effects observed in the first estimates are actually picking up an export effect. The results in column (2) suggest this is not the case. The coefficients on ∆M i and ∆V M i are quite robust to the inclusion of measures of exporting activity.
It might also be argued that the non-random nature of the sample may bias these results. Firms which appear in ITIS are larger and more successful than those which do not, and this may cause the apparent positive relationship between importing activity and employment growth.
To deal with this, in column (3) we include a set of dummies which capture the number of times a firm appears in the ITIS survey. This reduces only slightly the import effect, and actually increases the negative effect of exporting on employment growth.
In columns (4) and (5) we split the sample between manufacturing and business services firms. Firms in the business services sectors have larger estimated effects on ∆M i but smaller volume effects.
An important issue is whether we should also control for any change in firms' sales over the sample period. Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) control for the growth rate of firms' total sales to account for any shocks which might simultaneously increase the size of the firm and cause the firm to increase imports or exports. Controlling for sales growth captures the technological effect of offshoring by focusing on employment conditional on sales which, loosely speaking, corresponds to the labour intensity of the firm.
On the other hand, if a firm's trading pattern influences both employment growth and sales, then controlling for the latter will lead to attenuated estimates of the effect on employment growth, since sales and employment growth are likely to be highly correlated. If we do not control for sales growth, the estimates capture the total effect of offshoring including both its scale and technology effects. Therefore, in Table 11 we report the effect of services trade on employment, conditional on sales growth.
[ Table 11 here.]
The equivalent results in Table 11 show the impact of offshoring on employment conditional on the change in sales over the same period. Changes in sales, unsurprisingly, are highly correlated with changes in employment. The coefficient estimates on ∆M i and ∆V M i are smaller than those reported in Table 10 , and in almost all cases insignificantly different from zero. What this suggests is that starting to import services is associated with an increase in the size of the firm, but that it does not have an impact on the labour intensity of production. In other words, offshoring is not replacing labour-intensive inputs in the firm. This is perhaps not surprising given that the vast majority of offshoring comes from the US and Western Europe (Table 3) .
Exporting effects
Tables 10 and 11 also indicate the impact of exporting services on employment growth. The effects of exporting services on employment growth appear to be small and generally insignificant. This contrasts with the small literature which which finds that firms which export goods "do better" than non-exporters. There are a number of possible reasons for this difference.
Firstly most, if not all, the evidence on exporters focuses on exports of goods of manufacturing firms (see the literature reviews of Greenaway and Kneller (2007) and Wagner (2007) ). It may be that the sunk costs of exporting services are lower than those of exporting goods, in which case the selection of firms into exporters and non-exporters will be less extreme.
Second, we should keep in mind that these firms are not typically exporting their final output, but rather exporting a service which is itself an input into the production process. This is the case for all the manufacturing firms in our sample, as well as some proportion of the service sector firms.
Third, we include simultaneously imports and exports of services. There is little comparative evidence which does this. Exceptions are Muûls and Pisu (2007) , who show that in Belgian manufacturing and services industries importers are more productive and larger than exporters. Considering the manufacturing sector only, we show that controlling for imports reduces dramatically the size of the export dummy. Thus, since most of exporting firms also importers, a large part of the success of exporters is apparently explained not by their exporting activities, but by their imports. Bernard et al. (2005) report indirectly similar findings for the US. They show that importers are larger than exporters and that the growth in employment was faster for importers than exporters. Finally, MacGarvie (2006) shows that importing activities cause the number of foreign patents cited by importers to increase, whereas this is not true for exporters. This is taken as evidence that imports, contrary to exports, facilitate access to foreign technology.
Quantile regressions
The regression results in Table 10 suggest that rather than destroying jobs, offshoring is positively associated with employment growth at the mean. However, firms might be heterogeneous in their response to offshoring. For example, offshoring might increase job destruction in some firms but also increase job creation by more in others.
In Table 12 we use quantile regression to examine whether offshoring has different impacts on employment growth at different points in the distribution of ∆L i . 13 The 10th percentile is associated with large employment falls ∆L = −0.5, the 36th percentile corresponds to static labour demand ∆L i = 0, and the 85th percentile corresponds to large employment increases ∆L i = 1.
We find no evidence that offshoring is associated with employment falls, even in declining firms. The coefficient on ∆M i is positive at all three points in the distribution, although it is larger for faster-growing firms. This suggests that although offshoring is associated with increasing variance in employment growth across firms, there is no evidence that it leads to greater job turnover. This is, however, a rather weak test of the effects of offshoring on job turnover, because we cannot observe simultaneous creation and destruction within firms. 14 In particular, we cannot rule out the important possibility that offshoring causes firms to change the skill composition of their workforce, by laying off (for example) unskilled workers but hiring more skilled workers.
Matching estimators
An alternative approach to measuring the impact of service importing on employment growth is to explicitly match a treated firm (i.e. one that imports) with an observably similar control firm which does not import. This approach has several advantages over the regression methods used in the previous sections. Most importantly, it ensures that the predicted probability of importing for firms in the control group lies within the range of predicted probabilities for firms in the treatment group. The regression-based estimates use the whole sample, which may include firms which are extremely unlikely to ever engage in services trade.
We begin by considering the impact of starting to import services. The treatment group 13 Koenker and Bassett (1978) is a classic reference. 14 Table 6 shows that the job destruction rate is lower amongst firms which start to import compared to firms which never import. comprises those firms which start importing at some point during the sample period. A natural control group is firms which do not import services during the sample period. We therefore exclude from the comparison firms which always import and firms which stop importing. We then use single nearest neighbour propensity score matching to match a treated firm with a control firm, but we do so only for firms which have identical appearance patterns in ITIS.
Thus a firm which appears in ITIS three times is only compared with another firm which appears in ITIS three times. Treated firms are matched one-to-one to their nearest neighbour on the basis of the propensity score. The propensity score is estimated using a binary Logit regression of the treatment dummy on the same characteristics as in the regressions reported in Table 10 .
The unbiasedness of the propensity score estimates depends on whether the treatment and control groups can be considered observably identical after matching. In Table 14 we report the results of a series of balancing tests. For each appearance pattern in ITIS we compare the means of all covariates in the treatment and the control groups, and conduct a series of t-tests. Table 14 shows that, before matching, the characteristics of the treatment and control groups are significantly different for between 10-20% of covariates. Columns 3 and 4 shows that matching successfully pairs firms with similar characteristics in almost every case.
Our employment growth results are reported in Table 13 , and are largely consistent with the regression results. Starting to import services has a significant effect on employment growth, while starting to export has no significant effect. The results are largely unaffected by the choice of matching method. In Table 15 we report estimates of the average treatment effect for a variety of matching methods.
We repeat the exercise for firms which start to trade more or less than the median amounts. Firms which import more than the median amount have larger employment effects than those which import less. Interestingly, firms which start exporting more than the median experience significant employment falls.
Conclusions
Despite the popular and political debate surrounding offshoring and job loss, there is little existing evidence linking the two. In this paper we provide the first firm-level study of the relationship between offshoring and employment. Our measure of offshoring is the import of intermediate services. Several key results emerge.
First, a large number of firms are engaged in the export and import of intermediate services.
For those firms in the manufacturing sector these exports are not the export of their final good. This process is of course a logical consequence of the globalisation of production.
When a firm fragments its production into stages, some services will be exported as well as imported. Thus it is not really appropriate to describe the export of these intermediate services as "inshoring".
Second, we find no evidence that the imports of intermediate services are associated with job loss. In fact, firms which import services have faster employment growth than those which do not. This appears to result from the cost-saving or productivity effects of offshoring that give rise to an increase in the scale of production. Our finding is robust to the choice of estimation method (regression and propensity score matching).
Finally, we find much less evidence of a positive relationship between exports and employment growth, and in some cases we find that increased exporting is associated with job loss.
These results represent initial descriptive evidence of services trade and employment at the firm-level. Two key issues warrant further research. First, we would like to be able to distinguish between firms which start offshore-outsourcing from those that switch from domestic to offshore-outsourcing. It may be that the positive employment effects we observe arise because firms are engaged in the latter. To analyse this issue requires data on firms' domestic and offshore outsourcing activities. Second, we would like to analyse how offshoring affects worker turnover within the firm, as well as employment growth. In short, firms which engage in international production may lay-off some workers and hire others. Thus job security may decline despite increases in employment overall. To analyse this issue requires linked worker-firm data which includes information on firms' outsourcing activities. The table shows the number of t-statistics which are greater than the indicated significance level. The propensity score is estimated using 55 covariates (initial sales, initial employment level (10 categories), industry (33 categories), region (9 categories) and foreign ownership) separately for each appearance pattern in ITIS. There are seven appearance patterns, hence 55 × 7 = 385 mean comparisons. 
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